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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Kerry Stephen Thomas appeals from the district court’s judgment summarily 
dismissing his amended petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Mr. Thomas 
contends the district court erred by dismissing his petition because an evidentiary 
hearing was necessary to resolve the genuine issues of material fact on one of 
Mr. Thomas’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Mr. Thomas 
asserted his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate an affirmative defense 
prior to advising Mr. Thomas to plead guilty. Trial counsel also misled Mr. Thomas to 
believe he conducted an investigation and, based on that purported investigation, the 
defense was not an option. But for his counsel’s deficient performance, Mr. Thomas 
would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial. The district court should 
have allowed an evidentiary hearing to address the genuine issues of material fact 
raised in this claim. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 In March of 2009, in Ada County CR 2009-4448, Mr. Thomas was indicted on 
seven counts of transfer of body fluid which may contain the Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus (“HIV”), a felony, in violation of I.C. § 39-608. (R., p.354.) He was also charged as 
a persistent violator pursuant to I.C. § 19-2514. (R., p.354.) Idaho Code section 39-608 
states in relevant part: 
Any person who exposes another in any manner with the intent to infect 
or, knowing that he or she is or has been afflicted with acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), AIDS related complexes (ARC), or 
other manifestations of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection, 
transfers or attempts to transfer any of his or her body fluid, body tissue or 
 2 
organs to another person is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the state prison for a period not to exceed fifteen (15) 
years, by fine not in excess of five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both 
such imprisonment and fine. 
 
I.C. § 39-608(1). The seven counts of I.C. § 39-608 arose out of Mr. Thomas’s romantic 
relationship with the alleged victim over two or three months in late 2008, early 2009. 
(Aug. R.,1 pp.2–3.) Mr. Thomas is HIV positive. (Aug. R., pp.2–3.)  
 In June of 2009, Mr. Thomas entered a guilty plea to two of the seven counts, 
and the remaining five counts and the persistent violator enhancement were dismissed. 
(R., p.354.) In September of 2009, the district court sentenced Mr. Thomas to fifteen 
years, with ten years fixed, for each count, to be served consecutively, for a total 
sentence of thirty years, with twenty years fixed. (R., pp.354–55.) The district court also 
ordered the sentences to be served consecutive to any sentence imposed for 
Mr. Thomas’s violation of his probation (also for a prior conviction of I.C. § 39-608). 
(R., pp.73, 355.)  
 After sentencing, Mr. Thomas moved to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., p.9.) 
State v. Thomas, No. 36947, 2011 WL 11047272, at *1 (Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2011). The 
district court denied his motion. (R., p.9.) Thomas, 2011 WL 11047272, at *1. On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s order denying his motion and 
remanded the case for further proceedings on whether Mr. Thomas was advised his 
sentence could be served consecutive to the sentence for the probation violation. 
Thomas, 2011 WL 11047272, at *4. On remand, the district court again denied 
                                            
1 Page 3 of the Amended Petition is missing from the clerk’s record. 
Contemporaneously with this brief, Mr. Thomas filed a motion to augment the record to 
add a complete version of his Amended Petition. 
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Mr. Thomas’s motion to withdraw his plea, but entered an amended judgment of 
conviction ordering his sentence to be served concurrent with the sentence for the 
probation violation. (R., pp.9, 47. 73.) Mr. Thomas appealed, and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed. State v. Thomas, No. 39374, 154 Idaho 305 (2013). (R., pp.47, 73.) A 
remittitur was issued March 29, 2013. (R., pp.47, 73.)  
 On March 10, 2014, Mr. Thomas filed a timely pro se Verified Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. (R., pp.8–24.) Mr. Thomas raised three claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel: (1) failure to investigate the affirmative defense of consent; (2) 
improper advisement of the mens rea element of I.C § 39-608; and (3) failure to 
investigate the affirmative defense of medical advice. (R., pp.12–23.) Relevant for 
claims (1) and (3), I.C. § 39-608 includes two affirmative defenses: 
(3)  Defenses: 
 
 (a)  Consent. It is an affirmative defense that the sexual activity 
took place between consenting adults after full disclosure by the accused 
of the risk of such activity. 
 (b)  Medical advice. It is an affirmative defense that the transfer of 
body fluid, body tissue, or organs occurred after advice from a licensed 
physician that the accused was noninfectious. 
 
I.C. § 39-608. Mr. Thomas also moved for the appointment of counsel and for the 
district court to take judicial notice of the record, transcripts, and presentence materials 
in the underlying criminal case, CR 2009-4448. (R., pp.35–36, 39–40.)  
 On March 11, 2014, the district court granted Mr. Thomas’s motion to appoint 
counsel, but only with respect to claim (1). (R., pp.46–51.) The district court notified 
Mr. Thomas of its intent to dismiss claims (2) and (3) in twenty days unless its concerns 
with those two claims were addressed in a responsive brief. (R., pp.46–51.) The district 
court provided that appointed counsel could, but was not required, to assist Mr. Thomas 
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in addressing its concerns. (R., p.51.) On March 31, 2014, Mr. Thomas, through 
counsel, responded to the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss and moved for the 
appointment of counsel on all three claims. (R., pp.67–70.) On April 3, 2014, the district 
court dismissed claims (2) and (3) with prejudice. (R., pp.72–78.)  
 On September 25, 2014, the State moved for summary dismissal of claim (1). 
(R., pp.84–86, 88–93.) The district court then took judicial notice of the record, 
transcripts, and presentence materials in the underlying criminal case, CR 2009-4448. 
(R., p.120.) On December 12, 2014, the district court held a hearing and denied the 
State’s motion for summary disposition. (R., pp.125, 128–34; see generally Tr. Vol. I.2) 
The district court set an evidentiary hearing for March 9, 2015. (R., pp.125, 134.)  
 The evidentiary hearing was vacated and reset multiple times. (R., p.290.) On 
July 2, 2015, Mr. Thomas moved to vacate the evidentiary hearing and requested 
additional time to file an amended petition, possibly with new claims for relief. 
(R., pp.143–45.) The district court held a hearing on July 14, 2015. (See generally 
Tr. Vol. II.) The district court vacated the evidentiary hearing, gave Mr. Thomas 90 days 
to file a motion for leave to file an amended petition, and reset the evidentiary hearing 
for October 16, 2015. (Tr. Vol. II, p.17, L.22–p.21, L.9.)  
 On September 11, 2015, Mr. Thomas moved to amend his petition. (R., p.179.) 
The district court granted his motion. (R., pp.289–94.) Mr. Thomas raised two claims of 
                                            
2 There are three transcripts in the record on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, 
contains the hearing on the State’s first motion for summary dismissal, held on 
December 12, 2014. The second, cited as Volume II, contains a hearing on 
Mr. Thomas’s motion to vacate the evidentiary hearing, held on July 14, 2015. The third, 
cited as Volume III, contains the hearing on the State’s second motion for summary 
dismissal, held on February 26, 2016.  
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ineffective assistance of counsel in his Amended Petition.3 First, similar to claim (1), 
Mr. Thomas asserted his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the affirmative 
defense of consent. (R., pp.297–98.) Second, Mr. Thomas claimed his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to investigate the affirmative defense of medical advice. 
(R., pp.298–301.) Specifically, Mr. Thomas asserted that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to contact his treating physician, James C. Roscoe, M.D., to investigate whether 
Mr. Thomas was advised by Dr. Roscoe that he was noninfectious. (R., pp.298–301.) 
The district court found that this new second claim was similar but not identical to claims 
(2) and (3) in the original Verified Petition. The district court reasoned: 
[T]he second claim is similar to the second and third claims in the original 
Petition, in that Petitioner is challenging the interpretation of a statute and 
the failure to interview Dr. Roscoe; however, in the Amended Petition, 
Petitioner alleges defense counsel was ineffective for [not] exploring the 
defense of medical advice under Idaho Code § 39-608(3)(b) in that 
Petitioner did not believe he would likely transmit HIV based on 
conversations with Dr. Roscoe (whereas in the original Petition, Petitioner 
alleged defense counsel did not properly understand the mental state 
required for conviction under Idaho Code § 39-608(1)). 
 
(R., p.293.) Therefore, the district court found the Amended Petition did “not improperly 
seek to reintroduce claims that were previously dismissed with prejudice.” (R., p.293.) 
The district court also found: “The State is not prejudiced by allowing the Amended 
Petition, nor does the Court find there are any dilatory or bad faith motives on the part of 
the Petitioner in seeking the amendment.” (R., p.293.) “In the interests of justice and out 
of an abundance of caution,” the district court allowed Mr. Thomas “to proceed with his 
Amended Petition.” (R., pp.293–94.)  
                                            
3 Mr. Thomas’s Amended Petition incorporated by reference “all arguments and 
affidavits previously, contemporaneously, and subsequently made in support of the 
original Petition and this Amended Petition for post-conviction relief.” (Aug. R., p.1.)  
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 The State moved for summary disposition of the Amended Petition. (R., pp.303–
04, 305–23.) Mr. Thomas opposed the motion. (R., pp.326–39.) The district court held a 
hearing on the State’s motion on February 26, 2016. (See generally Tr. Vol. III.) On 
March 7, 2016, the district court issued an order granting the State’s motion. 
(R., pp.354–67.) With respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failing to 
investigate the medical advice defense, the district court ruled: 
In this case, the term “noninfectious” is neither vague on its face nor as 
applied in this case.4 The most reasonable interpretation is literally not 
infectious. If [trial counsel] filed a motion regarding this issue in the 
underlying matter, it would have been denied. Thus, there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and neither prong of Strickland5 is violated.  
 
(R., p.367.) The district court issued a Judgment dismissing Mr. Thomas’s Amended 
Petition with prejudice. (R., p.369.) Mr. Thomas timely appealed. (R., pp.375–78.)  
                                            
4 Mr. Thomas also argued the term “noninfectious” as used in I.C. § 39-608(3)(b) was 
unconstitutionally vague. (R., p.299.) He does not pursue this argument on appeal. 
5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Thomas’s Amended Petition for 
post-conviction relief?  
 8 
ARGUMENT 





Mr. Thomas raises one error on appeal. He asserts the district court erred by 
summarily dismissing his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 
investigate the affirmative defense of medical advice. The district court erred because 
an evidentiary hearing was necessary to resolve the genuine issues of material fact 
regarding trial counsel’s deficient performance in failing to contact Dr. Roscoe and the 
prejudice to Mr. Thomas due to counsel’s advice to plead guilty without any 
investigation of this defense. 
  
B. Post-Conviction Jurisprudence & Standard Of Review 
 
A petition for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 
345, 361 (2013).  
Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant for post-conviction relief 
must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which 
the application for post-conviction relief is based. Grube v. State, 134 
Idaho 24 (2000). Unlike the complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, 
an application for post-conviction relief must contain more than “a short 
and plain statement of the claim” that would suffice for a complaint under 
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be 
verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the 
applicant. I.C. § 19-4903. The application must include affidavits, records, 
or other evidence supporting its allegations, or must state why such 
supporting evidence is not included. Id.  
 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). 
 The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. 
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amend. VI. “[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 
397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, the petitioner must generally show that (1) his attorney’s performance did not 
meet “an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) his attorney’s deficient 
performance prejudiced him. Id. at 687–88. “Although Strickland concerned an 
allegation of ineffective assistance in a sentencing proceeding, the same standard 
applies equally to claims arising from the plea process.” McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 
847, 850 (2004) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985)). 
The district court can summarily dismiss or grant a petition for post-conviction 
relief if “there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c). “In considering summary dismissal 
of an application for post-conviction relief, the trial court must accept as true verified 
allegations of fact in the application or in supporting affidavits, no matter how incredible 
they may appear, unless they have been disproved by other evidence in the record.” 
Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 901, 909 (Ct. App. 1995). The district court is “required to 
accept the petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the 
petitioner’s conclusions.” Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. Any disputed facts are 
construed in favor of the non-moving party, and “all reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.” Vavold v. State, 148 
Idaho 44, 45 (2009). A petition for post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel will “survive a motion for summary dismissal if the petitioner 
establishes: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel’s performance was 
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deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced 
petitioner’s case.” Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583 (2000). If a genuine issue of 
material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the 
factual issues. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272 (Ct. App. 2002). 
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application 
without an evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a 
genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and 
admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally construe 
the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. 
 
Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. Because the evaluation of a motion for summary 
disposition does not involve the finding of contested facts by the district court, it 
necessarily involves only determinations of law. Accordingly, an appellate court reviews 
a district court’s summary dismissal order de novo. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 
402–03 (2006). 
 
C. The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Thomas’s Claim Of 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To Investigate The Affirmative 
Defense Of Medical Advice  
 
Mr. Thomas asserts he established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of 
counsel due to his counsel’s failure to investigate an affirmative defense in I.C. § 39-
608. The statute provides: “It is an affirmative defense that the transfer of body fluid, 
body tissue, or organs occurred after advice from a licensed physician that the accused 
was noninfectious.” I.C. § 39-608(3)(b). In his petitions and accompanying affidavits, 
Mr. Thomas claimed his counsel was deficient because his counsel never contacted 
Dr. Roscoe—even though Mr. Thomas told his counsel that he believed, based on 
Dr. Roscoe’s advice, he was noninfectious. (R., p.26; Aug. R., pp.5–7.) Moreover, 
Mr. Thomas’s counsel acted unreasonably by misrepresenting to Mr. Thomas that he 
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contacted Dr. Roscoe and the defense was not an option. (R., pp.15, 26.) This deficient 
performance prejudiced Mr. Thomas because, had Mr. Thomas known his counsel 
never investigated the affirmative defense and failed to contact Dr. Roscoe, Mr. Thomas 
would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. (R., pp.20, 29, 111, 
300.) 
 
1. Mr. Thomas’s Counsel Performed Deficiently By Failing To Contact 
Dr. Roscoe And Then Mispresenting His Investigation To Mr. Thomas 
 
Mr. Thomas submits he established a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether his counsel’s performance was deficient by failing to contact Dr. Roscoe to 
investigate a potential affirmative defense and then misleading Mr. Thomas about his 
investigation. An evidentiary hearing was necessary to resolve the factual issues, and 
therefore the district court erred by summarily dismissing this claim. 
“Deficient performance by an attorney is performance that falls ‘outside the wide 
range of professional norms.’” McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850 (2004) (quoting 
State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 306 (1999)). “Counsel is strongly presumed to have 
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment.” Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396, 412 (Ct. App. 
2013). “The duty to investigate requires only that counsel conduct a reasonable 
investigation.” Id. at 412–13. “In assessing the reasonableness of counsel’s 
investigation,” the Court considers “not only the quantum of evidence known to counsel, 
but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate 
further.” Id. Trial counsel’s tactical decisions cannot justify relief “unless the decision is 
shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or 
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other shortcomings capable of objective review.” State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561 
(2008). 
Here, based on the evidence presented by Mr. Thomas, Mr. Thomas’s counsel 
did not conduct a reasonable investigation prior to advising Mr. Thomas to plead guilty. 
Mr. Thomas’s affidavit and original verified petition state that he asked his attorney to 
contact Dr. Roscoe. (R., pp.15, 26.) Dr. Roscoe is a certified HIV specialist and treated 
Mr. Thomas during the time of the alleged offenses. (R., pp.15, 31–32, 181–82.) 
Mr. Thomas also stated that he informed his attorney, “I had an undetectable viral load; 
and furthermore, that persons’ with an undetectable viral load are sexually non-
infectious.” (R., p.26.) According to Mr. Thomas’s verified petition and affidavit, trial 
counsel agreed to contact Dr. Roscoe. (R., pp.15, 20, 26.) Yet, despite his assurances, 
trial counsel never contacted Dr. Roscoe prior to advising Mr. Thomas to plead guilty. 
Indeed, Dr. Roscoe’s affidavit states that he “was never contacted” by Mr. Thomas’s 
attorney. (R., p.33.) Dr. Roscoe’s affidavits also provide that he never spoke directly 
with anyone from the Ada County Public Defender’s office before sentencing. 
(R., pp.33, 182.) Trial counsel, however, told Mr. Thomas that he did contact 
Dr. Roscoe prior to Mr. Thomas’s entry of a guilty plea. (R., pp.15, 20, 21, 26, 27.) Trial 
counsel told Mr. Thomas that Dr. Roscoe “did not share” his “understanding of HIV” and 
would not confirm that his viral load was undetectable. (R., pp.15, 26). In sum, 
Mr. Thomas’s petitions and accompanying evidence show trial counsel failed to 
investigate a potential defense to the charges, misled Mr. Thomas about his 
investigation, and advised Mr. Thomas the defense was not viable. This was deficient 
performance.  
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Moreover, the information that trial counsel would have received from Dr. Roscoe 
would have supported the defense or, at the very least, warranted further investigation. 
Dr. Roscoe stated in his affidavits that, if he had been contacted by Mr. Thomas’s 
counsel, he would have provided the following information:  (1) Mr. Thomas was taking 
highly active antiretroviral therapy (“HAART”) to suppress HIV viral replication; (2) Due 
to HAART, Mr. Thomas’s viral load was “undetectable” at the time of the alleged 
offenses; (3) Mr. Thomas was informed by Dr. Roscoe that his viral load was 
undetectable; (4) Effective antiretroviral therapy renders a person on such therapy 
“extraordinarily unlikely, if not impossible, to transmit HIV to another person by any 
means, including unprotected sexual activity”; (4) HIV medical professionals can 
counsel their patients with undetectable viral loads that “transmission of their HIV 
infection, by any mode, is extremely unlikely”;6 and (6) “Based on my conversations with 
Mr. Thomas, Mr. Thomas was lead [sic] to believe that he had an extremely low risk 
(less than 1%) of infecting a partner with HIV through normal sexual activity.” 
(R., pp.32–33, 182.) This information would have been essential to evaluating the 
defense of whether Mr. Thomas was advised by Dr. Roscoe that he was noninfectious. 
I.C. § 39-608(c). But, because trial counsel never contacted Dr. Roscoe, trial counsel 
did not have this information while advising Mr. Thomas to plead guilty. Considering the 
evidence presented and any reasonable inferences, trial counsel was deficient for failing 
to investigate a potential defense to the charges, yet informing Mr. Thomas the defense 
was not viable. 
                                            
6 Dr. Roscoe added a caveat that, “Though I would never advise HIV positive clients to 
have unprotected sex, including Kerry Thomas.” (R., p.33.)  
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The district court’s ruling on deficient performance indicates that it found 
Mr. Thomas failed to present a genuine issue of material fact as to his “noninfectious” 
status. The district court ruled, “[T]he most reasonable interpretation is literally not 
infectious” and therefore, if trial counsel filed a motion to dismiss the charges based in 
the medical advice defense, the motion “would have been denied.” (R., p.367.) 
However, whether Mr. Thomas was actually noninfectious is irrelevant to the defense. 
What matters is whether Mr. Thomas was advised by Dr. Roscoe that he was 
noninfectious. I.C. § 39-608(3)(b). Mr. Thomas’s, not Dr. Roscoe’s, understanding of his 
HIV status is the primary consideration. Based on Mr. Thomas’s and Dr. Roscoe’s 
affidavits, Mr. Thomas presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Dr. Roscoe advised Mr. Thomas he was noninfectious. Mr. Thomas’s counsel was 
deficient by failing to investigate this defense despite the fact that Mr. Thomas told his 
counsel that he believed he was noninfectious.  
Finally, this claim is not disproved by the record, as argued by the State in district 
court. The State noted that trial counsel stated at sentencing: 
The literature also talks in great detail -- and Dr. Beaver provided me with 
a number of studies, as well as his doctor who treats him at the clinic, 
Dr. Roscoe. There is a great thriving debate right now in the HIV 
community in regard to people who have virtually undetectable levels of 
viral load. And Dr. Roscoe, his doctor, told me that Kerry’s viral load is 
virtually undetectable. And to a certain extent that’s not relevant. I 
understand that. The statute says you have HIV, you have intimate 
contact, you have to notify. It doesn’t require that you have an elevated 
viral load -- understood. But it does, in fact, go into the mindset of 
someone who has HIV and is told by their doctor that they’re essentially 
not capable of infecting other people.  
 
(R., p.323; see also R., p.235 (State’s Ex. 6, Sent. Tr., p.99, L.24–p.100, L.13).) But this 
excerpt of the sentencing hearing does not disprove Mr. Thomas’s claim: that his 
counsel failed to investigate the medical advice defense prior to advising Mr. Thomas to 
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plead guilty. Trial counsel’s statements at sentencing indicate only that trial counsel was 
told at some point by Dr. Roscoe that Mr. Thomas’s viral load was “virtually 
undetectable.” It does not affirmatively show that trial counsel spoke with Dr. Roscoe 
before Mr. Thomas pled guilty. In fact, Dr. Roscoe’s affidavits indicate that he may have 
communicated with someone on the defense team at or around the time of sentencing. 
Dr. Roscoe explained that he was present at sentencing to testify as to Mr. Thomas’s 
medical condition, but he was not called upon to address the district court. (R., pp.33, 
182.) This scenario is supported by the record. Immediately after trial counsel’s 
statements regarding Dr. Beaver and Dr. Roscoe, the following exchange occurred: 
[Defense Counsel]: Dr. Roscoe told me -- 
[Prosecutor]: Objection. 
[Defense Counsel]: -- that there are -- 
[Prosecutor]: Objection. There’s nothing in the record to support that 
argument -- nothing. 
 
The Court: I’ll sustain the objection. There’s no expert testimony here that 
makes any statement to that effect. 
 
(R., p.235 (State’s Ex. 6, Sent. Tr., p.100, Ls.14–21.) Thus, the record supports 
Dr. Roscoe’s affidavit indicating he was present at the sentencing hearing (but did not 
testify) and may have communicated with someone on the defense team around that 
time. At best, the State’s argument proves there are genuine issues of material fact as 
to when Dr. Roscoe was contacted by the defense team, who contacted him, and what 
information he provided. Dr. Roscoe’s affidavit makes clear, however, that he “was 
never contacted by any member of Mr. Thomas’s criminal defense team before 
Mr. Thomas was sentenced.” (R., pp.33, 182 (emphasis added).) This is the critical 
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time: prior to sentencing when trial counsel was advising Mr. Thomas to plead guilty. 
And, based on the evidence presented by Mr. Thomas and all reasonable inferences 
therein, Mr. Thomas established a prima facie case of deficient performance for his 
counsel’s failure to contact Dr. Roscoe to investigate a viable defense prior to the entry 
of his guilty plea. 
  
2. Mr. Thomas Was Prejudiced By His Counsel’s Deficient Performance 
 
In addition to deficient performance, Mr. Thomas submits he established genuine 
issues of material fact as to whether his counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him 
by affecting the outcome of the plea process. An evidentiary hearing was necessary to 
resolve the factual issues, and therefore the district court erred by summarily dismissing 
this claim.  
After a defendant shows that his counsel was deficient, prejudice is shown if 
there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceedings would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “When applying the prejudice prong to a case 
involving ineffective assistance of counsel in agreeing to a plea, the petitioner must 
show that counsel’s deficient performance ‘affected the outcome of the plea process.’” 
McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 851 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 
Idaho 76, 82 (2002)). Put another way, “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, 
the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” 
McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 851 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59).  
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Here, Mr. Thomas established that he would not have pled guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial but for his trial counsel’s deficient performance. In his Amended 
Petition, Mr. Thomas claimed: “Had an appropriate investigation been performed, the 
Petitioner would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on proceeding to trial.” 
(R., p.300.) Similarly, in his original Verified Petition, Mr. Thomas stated: 
As the case progressed counsel began to advise Petitioner to 
change his plea to guilty. Counsel misled Petitioner into believing 
Dr. Roscoe had refused to corroborate Petitioner’s account of his 
condition, stating: “I talked with the doctor” . . . “he doesn’t share your 
understanding of HIV.”. . . Petitioner believed [his attorney]. Gradually 
those interactions had a profound affect upon Petitioner resulting in 
Thomas’s inability to resist his lawyer’s assertive advice. 
 
(R., p.20.) Mr. Thomas’s Verified Petition also shows that he did not find out his attorney 
“personally never spoke with Dr. Roscoe” until June 11, 2013, well after he pled guilty. 
(R., p.21.) Moreover, Mr. Thomas’s affidavit confirms that he entered the guilty plea 
“with the understanding” that his attorney “had fully investigated the affirmative 
defenses” in I.C. § 39-608(3). (R., p.29.) He stated that his trial counsel “assured” him 
“that everything had been fully explored,” including the medical advice defense. 
(R., p.28.) He explained, “I was very reluctant and only agreed to change my plea 
because I believed [trial counsel] had talked to my doctor, done a full investigation, and 
that I had no other alternative than to abandon my defense.” (R., p.111.) Mr. Thomas 
further stated:   
Upon information and belief, [trial counsel] misled me to understand every 
viable defense had been fully considered; that my only recourse was to 
“plead guilty” or face a certain “life sentence[.]” Moreover, I am now to 
understand such representations are categorically false; and, were I 
aware of such facts I would not have abandoned my defenses nor agreed 
to plead guilty. 
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(R., p.29.) Thus, Mr. Thomas’s petitions and accompanying affidavits establish the 
prejudice requirement. The evidence shows a reasonable probability that, but for trial 
counsel’s errors, Mr. Thomas would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial.  
With regard to prejudice, the district court examined whether trial counsel would 
have filed a motion to dismiss based on the defense and whether the motion would 
prevail. (R., p.367.) Mr. Thomas contends this analysis was in error. Mr. Thomas did not 
allege his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss; he argued his 
counsel was ineffective for advising him to plead guilty. “[W]here the alleged error of 
counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the 
crime charged, the resolution of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend largely on whether 
the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 
However, as the Court cautioned in McKeeth: 
The impact of counsel’s errors on the defendant’s chances of success at 
trial is a factor a court may use when determining the plausibility of the 
defendant’s claim that those errors played a significant role in the decision 
to plead guilty. In other words, the likelihood that without counsel’s errors 
a defendant may or may not have been able to prevail at trial is relevant 
only to the extent it sheds light on the defendant’s state of mind when he 
pleaded guilty.  
 
McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 852 (citations omitted). Here, Mr. Thomas established a prima 
facie case of prejudice. Mr. Thomas’s guilty plea was not entered knowingly and 
voluntarily because, when he pled guilty, he believed his trial counsel investigated, 
considered, and then eliminated the medical advice defense. With regard to succeeding 
at trial, an evidentiary hearing was necessary to resolve when, if at all, the defense 
team contacted Dr. Roscoe and what information Dr. Roscoe provided to them. If, as 
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Mr. Thomas asserted in his affidavit, Dr. Roscoe advised Mr. Thomas he was 
noninfectious, Mr. Thomas would have had a defense to charges. Considering the 
evidence presented by Mr. Thomas and reasonable inferences, the affirmative defense 
of medical advice likely would have succeeded at trial. Therefore, Mr. Thomas showed 
a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty 
and would have insisted on going to trial with the affirmative defense of medical advice. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Thomas respectfully requests that this Court vacate the summary dismissal 
of his amended petition for post-conviction relief respect to the issue of whether trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the medical advice defense and remand 
the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue.    
 DATED this 31st day of October, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      JENNY C. SWINFORD 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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